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INTRODUCTION
The recent active role taken by the Security Council in the mainte-
nance of international peace and security has provided a fertile ground
for international lawyers.' Many legal issues previously of theoretical
* Reader in Law, University of Adelaide. Ph.D., University of Melbourne (1991); LL.M.,
University of Melbourne (1980); LL.B., University of Western Australia (1969). 1 am grateful
to Adrian Bradbrook who patiently allowed me to work through with him many of the ideas
for this paper, and Simon Pritchard who provided valuable research assistance and helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this work.
1. Although the activity of the Security Council under Chapter VII is completely
unprecedented, it has not, in the majority of cases, involved the use of force. The new role of
the Security Council commenced with the imposition of widespread economic sanctions
against Iraq in response to its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. See SC Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990). This new found activity under Chapter VII
has continued with economic sanctions and arms embargoes in SC Res. 757, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3082d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992) (in relation to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)); SC Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg.,
U.N. Doe. S/RES/733 (1992) (in relation to Somalia); SC Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992) (in relation to Libya); SC Res. 788, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3138th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992) (in relation to Liberia); SC Res. 841,
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interest are now of considerable practical importance.2 Moreover, in
the context of humanitarian law, much of the recent focus of commenta-
tors has understandably been concentrated on the potential of the Securi-
ty Council to take a role in its implementation and enforcement.3
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993) (in relation to Haiti); and
SC Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994) (in relation
to Rwanda).
The Security Council has also established international tribunals to try persons responsi-
ble for serious violations of international humanitarian law. See SC Res. 827, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (in relation to the Former Yugoslavia);
SC Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (in relation
to Rwanda).
In recent years the Security Council has authorized the use of force in a number of
situations. See, e.g., SC Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990) (in relation to Kuwait); SC Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/794 (1992) (in relation to Somalia); SC Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (in relation to the protection of Bosnian airspace); SC Res. 836,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993) (in relation to the protec-
tion of Bosnian safe areas); SC Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/929 (1994) (in relation to Rwanda); and SC Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) (in relation to Haiti).
2. For example, the general relationship between Article 51 and the other provisions of
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter assumed new significance with the Persian Gulf
conflict. In particular, opinions differ as to whether the mere adoption of measures by the
Security Council under Article 41 brings to an end the right of self-defence of States. Article
51 expressly states that this right is available "until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security." See Christopher Greenwood, New
World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 MoD. L. REv. 153,
163-64 (1992).
The legal basis of the Security Council's recent practice of "authorizing" States to use
force is unclear. See infra note 8. The issue of consent in the context of peacekeeping
activities has been highlighted by the actions of States and the Security Council in Somalia.
Moreover, the very jurisdiction of the Security Council under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter,
specifically the meaning of "threat to the peace," warrants consideration in light of the broad
interpretation this phrase has recently received.
3. Article 89 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions refers to the role of the United
Nations in relation to serious violations of the Conventions or.Protocol. Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 43, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1429
(adopted on June 8, 1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. Moreover, the Security Council has made
it clear on many occasions that it regards breaches of humanitarian law as having the poten-
tial to constitute a "threat to the peace" within the meaning of Article 39, a finding that
confers Chapter VII jurisdiction on the Council. Of particular significance in this context is
the establishment by the Security Council of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. Pursuant to SC Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (1993), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report within sixty
days on proposals for the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law. The subsequent Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), which included a proposed statute for the tribunal, was
approved by the Security Council. See SC Res. 827, supra note 1. See also SC Res. 955,
supra note 1, which establishes an international tribunal for the prosecution of serious
violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of Rwanda and neighboring States.
For discussion of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, see generally James C. O'Brien, The
International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former
[Vol. 17:285
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Considerable attention has also been paid to the problem of protecting
peacekeepers.4
This article considers an issue that, given its importance for the
protection of combatants and civilians in armed conflict, has not attract-
ed the attention it warrants: namely, the extent to which legal restraints
derived from the ius in bello5 and the ius ad bellum6 apply to the Secu-
rity Council when it is taking military enforcement action under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.7 Although a position not free from
controversy, the recent practice of the Security Council in "authorizing"
States to use force to restore international peace and security is treated
as military enforcement action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
for the purposes of this paper.' Even if these actions are more
Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639 (1993); Christopher Greenwood, The International
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 69 INT'L AFF. 641 (1993); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in
Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1994). For
background on the Security Council and humanitarian law in general, see Christiane
Bourloyannis, The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335 (1992); Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes, The Collective Responsibility of States to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian
Principles, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 247, 251-56 (Arie Bloed et al. eds.,
1993).
4. The General Assembly in 1992 established an ad hoc Committee to draft a Conven-
tion for the protection of United Nations Personnel. The General Assembly adopted the
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, opened for signature
Feb. 17, 1995, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 141, U.N. Doc. AIRES/49/59 (1995).
See also Report of an Investigation into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in
Somalia, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/26351 (1993) (report prepared by Tom Farer);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PEACEKEEPING AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Al INDEX IOR 40/01/94
(1994).
5. The ius in bello is the term used to describe the rules regulating the conduct of
hostilities, otherwise referred to as humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict.
6. The ius ad bellum refers to the rules regulating the legality of the resort to force in
international law. D.W. Bowett puts forward the view shared by many writers that "the
Charter has made the [ius ad bellum] inapplicable to United Nations action." D.W. BOWETr,
UNITED NATIONS FORCES 506 (1964). See discussion infra note 32 and accompanying text.
7. For example, following the conclusion of the Gulf War, the then Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, commented on:
the need for a collective reflection on questions relating to the future use of the
powers vested in the Security Council under Chapter VII....
.. [T]hese questions should include the mechanisms required for the Council
to satisfy itself that the rule of proportionality in the employment of armed force is
observed and the rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts are
complied with.
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at
6, U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (1991).
8. The international community is currently experiencing the development of a new form
of enforcement activity under the U.N. Charter, based to some extent on the Persian Gulf and
Korean precedents. The question of what amounts to an exercise of the military enforcement
powers of the Security Council has been a question of ongoing concern to writers. Much
scholarly attention has been devoted to this question, although undoubtedly the new practice
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appropriately regarded as some sort of "hybrid" from a legal
perspective, the issue warrants attention as it would be directly raised if
a permanent military force were set up under the Charter.9 An analysis
of the legal regime of military enforcement action lays the groundwork
for any assessment of the application of the general principles of State
responsibility to the Security Council 0 and, moreover, the responsibility
of "authorization" warrants a renewed focus on where such a practice fits within the Charter
scheme. It is, however, not proposed to go over this ground again but rather to address the
consequences on the assumption that this is Security Council military enforcement action.
The major objections to "authorization" as amounting to enforcement action will once
again focus on the interpretation of the U.N. Charter that regards the Security Council's
military enforcement powers as dependent on the implementation of Article 43 agreements.
However, there is the widely held contrary view that Article 42 is consistent with various
arrangements using national forces. See, e.g., LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 281 (2d rev. ed. 1949).
See also Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452,
463-64 (1991) (arguing that the specific language of Article 42 does not prevent States from
voluntarily making forces available to the Security Council to carry out resolutions adopted
under Chapter VII). There is agreement, however, that the Security Council can only require
Member States to take forceful action through the permanent military forces contemplated by
Article 43. See LELAND M. GOODRICH & ANNE P. SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 278 (1955); John W. Halderman,
Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 971 (1962); 2 ROSALYN
HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: 1946-1967, at 175-78 (1970). This is also true of
peacekeeping forces. See Rosalyn Higgins, A General Assessment of United Nations Peace-
keeping, in UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS I (Antonio Cassese ed., 1978)
[hereinafter UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING]; Georg Schwarzenberger, Problems for a
United Nations Force, 12 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 247, 247-62 (1959). The view has also
been expressed that the practice of the Security Council of authorizing States to use force
cannot be a Chapter VII military enforcement action because the Council does not control the
operation. This was a widely debated issue in the context of the Persian Gulf conflict. The
various arguments are assessed by Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Self-Defence, Enforcement Action
and the Gulf Wars: 1980-88 and 1990-91, 63 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 299, 356 (1992). See infra
note 29 for sources discussing the legal basis of the resort to force in the Gulf War.
9. Discussion of this possibility was revived by the Persian Gulf conflict. See Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N.'s Response to Iraq's
Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 481-84 (1991).
10. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 179-80 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparation Case]. Ian Brownlie states:
If an organization has a legal personality distinct from that of the member states,
and functions which in the hands of states may create responsibility, then it is in
principle reasonable to impute responsibility to the organization. In a very general
way this follows from the reasoning of the Court in the Reparation case.
Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 688 (4th ed. 1990). However, as
Brownlie points out, the law is as yet undeveloped. Id.
The question of the application of principles of State responsibility to the United Nations
has received some attention in the context of peacekeeping activities. For example, the
suggestion that the United Nations is responsible for actions of its forces is confirmed in
Article 8 of the 1971 Zagreb Resolution of the Institute of International Law on Conditions of
Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United Nations
Forces May Be Engaged, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS AND RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 371, 375 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter 1971 Zagreb Resolution]. See also
[Vol. 17:285
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of States themselves."
Commentators distinguish two categories of illegal acts of interna-
tional organizations.' 2 The first comprise of illegal activities that are
shared in common with States: that is, breaches of international law.
The second class is limited to the special nature of international orga-
nizations and includes, for example, acts ultra vires the organization.
The discussion in this paper addresses the second type of illegal act by
considering whether certain actions of the Security Council exceed its
powers under the Charter: namely, those not in conformity with the
requirements of Article 24(2). A conclusion of ultra vires in such a case
will then raise the question of responsibility of international organiza-
tions for acts contrary to international law.
Tihomir Komenov, The Origin of State and Entity Responsibility for Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CoNF cTs 169 (Frits Kalshoven & Yves Sandoz eds., 1989).
The resolution of this issue, however, has become more pressing given the considerable
amounts of force used by recent peacekeeping and peacemaking forces, raising questions as to
the conformity of some of these actions with principles of international law, particularly
humanitarian law. Somalia is a case in point.
On the question of the application of principles of State responsibility to the United
Nations in general, see BowErr, supra note 6, at 491. See also Vera Gowlland-Debbas,
Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 55, 90-4 (1994). See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
11. The so called primary rules of State responsibility determine whether a State is in
breach of a requirement of international law, the secondary rules determine the consequences
of such a breach. This article assesses the substantive rules in relation to actions of the
Security Council and States acting under its authority. The issue as to the consequences is of
considerable complexity. There are several inter-related aspects, all of which require careful
analysis. There is the question as to what action an injured State can take if the Security
Council exceeds its mandate under the Charter. This is an issue of some importance in light
of the fact that the United Nations cannot be a party to any action before the International
Court of Justice. Thus, even if the Security Council acts within legal restraints, how will a
State enforce these?
A further fundamental point is whether the validity of Security Council actions is a
justiciable issue. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. Related to this is whether State
members can be responsible secondarily or concurrently in such cases. The issue arose in the
Tin Council Cases (Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Dep't of Trade & Indus., 3 All E.R. 257 (C.A.
1988), and J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade & Indus., 3 W.L.R. 969 (H.L.(E.) 1989)). See
C.F. Amerasinghe, Liability to Third Parties of Member States of International Organizations:
Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1991).
On the other hand it may be that a State acts ultra vires a Security Council resolution.
This was alleged to be the case in relation to State action in the Congo. See IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 335 n.1 (1963). The United
Nations accepted responsibility for the actions of the peacekeepers in that conflict and entered
into a number of compensation agreements with various States. See Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission to the General Assembly on Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
[1975] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1975.
12. See, e.g., Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Effects of Illegal Acts of International
Organizations, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR
88 (1965).
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The distinctive nature of Chapter VII powers generally was recently
highlighted by the judgement of the International Court of Justice in the
Lockerbie Case. 13 The Court has refocussed attention on the important
question as to what extent the Security Council functions within the
constraints of international law. As will become apparent from the later
discussion, an assumption to this effect appears to have underlined
analyses of the ius in bello and United Nations enforcement actions.14 It
is, however, an assumption that requires reappraisal given the current
significance of the question. The general question of the relationship
between the regime of humanitarian law and the organs of the United
Nations has already posed some difficult legal problems in the context
of traditional 15 peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. 16 The
extent to which the relevant parties are bound by the principles of
humanitarian law has been an area of legal uncertainty that has never
been satisfactorily resolved. 17 These activities in theory are distinguish-
able from enforcement actions in several respects. 18 The latter presup-
13. Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.) 1992 I.C.J. 114
(Apr. 14) (Request for Provisional Measures) [hereinafter Lockerbie Case]. The Court was
dealing with the Security Council's powers under Article 41. That these are enforcement
powers is clear from Article 2(7) of the Charter. They are, however, outside the scope of this
article since they do not involve the use of military force.
14. See part II.A.
15. For a description of the distinguishing characteristics of peacekeeping operations
prior to the end of the Cold War, see Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations
Peacekeeping, 69 INT'L AFF. 451, 452-55 (1993).
16. These forces are not specifically provided for by the provisions of the U.N. Charter.
Their compatibility with its provisions was, however, confirmed by the International Court of
Justice in Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 164-65 (July 20). In that
case, the Court was of the opinion that Chapter VII of the Charter envisages the Security
Council policing a situation even when it does not take enforcement action against a State. Id.
at 167.
For a comprehensive coverage of the constitutionality of forces exercising peacekeeping
and enforcement roles, see BOWETT, supra note 6, at 266-311. For a discussion of the legal
position in relation to humanitarian law and peacekeeping forces, see the comprehensive
studies by Bowett, id. at 484-92, and FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE
LAW OF PEACE AND WAR (1966) (these studies are not restricted to the question of the
application of humanitarian law to peacekeeping forces, but cover the legal issues raised by
enforcement actions generally under the Charter). See also Dietrich Schindler, United Nations
Forces and International Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET 521
(Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984); Komenov, supra note 10.
17. The legal position of all the parties involved in peacekeeping actions has been
extensively studied by commentators. See infra note 100. It is not proposed in this paper to
go in any detail over all this well worn ground, but instead to consider what new challenges
are posed in this area by the recent activities of the Security Council and any new insights
that might be provided by the Lockerbie Case.
18. The distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement functions of the Security
Council was drawn by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion in Certain
[Vol. 17:285
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pose some use of force against a State or States, whereas peacekeeping
functions do not. 9 Thus, peacekeeping activities to date have not posed
the same problems for humanitarian law, as the use of force in such
operations has been restricted to self-defence.20 Moreover, there is
generally speaking no situation amounting to a state of armed conflict
between the United Nations peacekeeping forces and the other parties
involved, so the application of the principles of humanitarian law has
not been to date a major issue.2' In contrast, the use of force plays a
Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 16, at 165, 177. The Court was considering the
meaning of "action" that was the exclusive province of the Security Council under Chapter
VII by virtue of Article 11(2) of the Charter. The Court was of the view that in this context
"action" meant coercive or enforcement action. Thus, the General Assembly had the power to
recommend the establishment of peacekeeping forces without infringing the limitation
contained in Article 11(2).
In recent times the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement has been
almost impossible to maintain. Although the peacekeeping operation in the Congo in the
1960s involved a considerable degree of force to end the secession of Katanga, the use of
force, generally speaking, has not been an issue in relation to peacekeeping activities.
However, this is no longer the case. The starting point of such discussions is the report by
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General
distinguishes between the United Nations roles of preventing conflict, keeping the peace, and
attempting to bring the conflicting parties to agreement by peaceful means. This latter
activity, peacemaking, goes beyond the more limited role of peacekeeping. BOUTROS
BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND
PEACE-KEEPING 11 (1992).
Since the publication of the Secretary-General's report, peacekeeping forces have been
increasingly authorized to use significantly more force than previously was the case. A great
deal of literature has been devoted to the implications of these new developments. See, e.g.,
Goulding, supra note 15; Rosalyn Higgins, The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia,
69 INT'L AFF. 465 (1993); W. Michael Reisman, Preparing to Wage Peace: Towards the
Creation of an International Peacemaking Command and Staff College, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 76
(1994). For a description of the current categories of peacekeeping, some of which involve
the use of substantial amounts of force, see Goulding, supra note 15, at 456-60 (1993). See
also Higgins, supra.
19. BOWETr, supra note 6, at 268 (noting that although a peacekeeping force may be
armed and may become involved in fighting, its main function is not the use of military force
to maintain or restore international peace and security). See also 1 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: 1946-1967, at ix (1969) (discussing the various meanings of the
term "peacekeeping").
20. "The force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character... Self-defence
would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its
duties under the mandate of the Security Council." Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/12611 (1978). For a
full statement of the meaning of self-defence in the context of peacekeeping forces, see Aide
Memoire dated 10 April 1964 Concerning some Questions Relating to the Function and
Operation of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, reprinted in 4 ROSALYN
HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: 1946-1967, at 150-52 (1981).
21. Consequently, there are no legal rules protecting peacekeepers from the activities of
the waning factions, a problem that has become more acute in recent peacekeeping operations
such as Somalia. In response, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel. See supra note 4. The Convention imposes obliga-
tions on individuals in relation to the protection of peacekeepers, the breach of which entails
criminal responsibility. See infra note 23 & 109.
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much more comprehensive role in peace-enforcement, increasing the
relevance of the principles of humanitarian law.22 A situation of armed
conflict would be envisaged in these actions.23 Moreover, the issues of
consent and impartiality that have assumed considerable importance in
recent peacekeeping operations are not relevant to enforcement actions. 24
It is not, however, necessary in this paper to distinguish between the
types of responses adopted by the Security Council to fulfill its mandate
of maintaining international peace or assess the increasingly blurred
distinction between traditional peacekeeping and the activities based on
the military enforcement powers of the Security Council. The distinction
of significance in this paper is not so much on what these forces are
called but what they in fact do.25 If their mandate involves the use of the
military enforcement powers of the Security Council under the U.N.
Charter, their actions raise the questions that are being discussed here.
Where forces are involved in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement
activities under the auspices of the Security Council, the application of
the principles of humanitarian law concerns combatants and civilians
alike. There is, however, another aspect of Security Council practice
under Chapter VII whose impact on civilians is causing disquiet - the
imposition of economic sanctions associated with an armed conflict.
Although the focus of this paper is actions of the Security Council
involving the use of force, sanctions have been, on several recent occa-
sions, associated with enforcement actions as an integral part of the
overall solution to the restoration of international peace and security. A
graphic illustration of the effect of such measures on the civilian popula-
22. See BOWETT, supra note 6, at 488-92 (discussing the principles of the law of armed
conflict that are relevant to United Nations forces).
23. Thus, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
supra note 4, does not cover Chapter VII forces as there are arguably existing rules applicable
in such situations. Whether as a matter of law the provisions of the law of armed conflict
apply between enforcement forces and other parties involved is examined later in this article.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the key elements of the
Convention, see Evan T. Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 621 (1995).
24. For a discussion of consent in relation to peacekeeping forces, see BowET, supra
note 6, at 412-22. See also Dan Ciobanu, The Power of the Security Council to Organize
Peace-Keeping Operations, in UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, supra note 8, at 15, 38-40.
25. In my view, there is no useful distinction to be drawn between forces exercising the
enforcement powers of the Security Council based upon how they are established. The legal
situation between the United Nations and Member States contributing forces will of course
differ depending on the nature of the agreement between the parties. For a description of
these agreements, see BOWETr, supra note 6, at 361-71. There are, however, many practical
and political problems arising from the recent practice of combining peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement measures. The drawbacks of this approach, particularly in the context of Soma-
lia, are described by Michael Bothe, Peacekeeping and the Use of Force - Back to the
Charter or Political Accident?, INT'L PEACEKEEPING, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 2.
(Vol. 17:285
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tion is the Persian Gulf conflict where the mandatory sanctions regime
has continued after the cessation of armed hostilities.26 The impact of
economic sanctions on the civilian population is not a new phenome-
non.2 7 But it has assumed a new aspect where economic sanctions are
associated with enforcement action of the Security Council. The civilian
population may well be devastated by the conflict. International initia-
tives to provide humanitarian assistance, however, have to overcome the
hurdle of the Sanctions Committee to enable the effects of the forceful
action on civilians to be minimized. This is one of the aspects of the
new role of the Security Council that has not been fully appreciated.
This article thus considers the additional limitations on the protection
offered by humanitarian law that flow from the imposition of economic
sanctions by the Security Council as part of its overall resolution of a
situation within Article 39 of the Charter.
In the background of discussions of the Security Council and its
powers in relation to enforcement measures, there is the question to
what extent military enforcement actions of the Security Council can be
constrained by principles derived from the ius ad bellum, such as neces-
sity and proportionality.2" It was never an issue in relation to peace-
keeping forces given their limited mandate to use force in self-defence,
but it has now assumed considerable practical significance. While argu-
ably not raised by the Persian Gulf conflict given the widely held view
that this was an action in collective self-defence rather than a Security
Council enforcement action,2' it is a fundamental question that' urgently
requires analysis in light of recent and potential future enforcement
actions by the Security Council.
26. See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 274 (Lori F.
Damrosch ed., 1993); Martti Koskenniemi, Le Comiti des sanctions (crej par la risolution 661
(1990) du Conseil de sicuriti), ANNUAIRE FRAN4;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 119 (1991);
Iraqis Live Only for the Next Meal, GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Nov. 20, 1994, at 13.
27. Stanislaw E. Nahlik, Le Problime des sanctions en droit international humanitaire,
in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCI-
PLES, supra note 16, at 469. See generally VERA GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, COLLECTIVE RESPONS-
ES TO ILLEGAL ACTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE QUESTION
OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA (1990).
28. For a discussion of necessity and proportionality in the ius ad bellum, see infra notes
65-67.
29. The legal basis of the resort to force in the Persian Gulf conflict has been thoroughly
canvassed by writers. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N. Police Action in Lieu
of War: "The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); Greenwood, supra note
2; Eugene. V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defence?, 85 AM.
J. INT'L L. 506 (1991); Schachter, supra note 8; Colin Warbrick, The Invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 482 (1991); Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678
and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
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A study of the issues indicates that the question of legal restraints
on Security Council military enforcement action with respect to both the
ius ad bellum and the ius in bello depends upon the view one takes as
to what the Charter intends. On the assumption that the Security Council
is governed to some extent by principles of international law, the task
then is to identify what these rules might be. At this point a distinction
becomes apparent between the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello. The
former, under current international law, is to be found solely in the
provisions of the Charter. There are arguably no principles of interna-
tional law that are applicable to Security Council military enforcement
action under the Charter. With respect to the latter, however, there is a
body of existing customary rules independent from the Charter that are
readily applicable to the Security Council when it is carrying out its
functions. Moreover, there is a relatively straightforward solution avail-
able to the problem of the Security Council and the conventional rules
of the ius in bello, namely a device by which the United Nations be-
comes bound by the relevant instruments.
Part I of this article examines whether the Charter scheme contem-
plates legal restraints on the resort to military force by the Security
Council. The conclusion is reached that it is possible to argue that the
purposes and principles of the Charter provide support for such a view.
What these restraints may consist of is then examined and the general
legal principles of necessity and proportionality are found to be appro-
priate for adaptation to the Charter scheme of collective enforcement
action. Part II of the article considers the ius in bello in military en-
forcement actions. It is argued that there is a well developed body of
humanitarian rules that in its entirety should be applicable to the Securi-
ty Council as much as any other international entity that is involved in
armed conflict. States, as a matter of priority, should take steps to
overcome the technical difficulties for the United Nations in acceding to
the relevant international instruments. Finally, the problems of Security
Council sanctions and the limits of the ius in bello in this context is
considered.
I. THE IUS AD BELLUM OF MILITARY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A. Sourcbs of Limits on Military Enforcement Actions
Recent practice has highlighted the question whether Chapter VII of
the Charter contemplates military enforcement action that is permissive
in nature and neither utilizes Article 43 forces nor is under the direct
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control of the Security Council. ° If the answer is in the negative then
this use of force is illegal.3 ' Such a conclusion flows from the nature of
the Charter. In contrast to the ius in bello, the only current source of the
ius ad bellum is the Charter itself.32 Under the UN Charter, the use of
force is restricted to self-defence under Article 51 and collective en-
forcement action under Chapter VII. 33 The Charter does incorporate to a
limited extent the pre-existing ius ad bellum.34 The reference to the
"inherent" right of self-defence in Article 51 is regarded as incorporat-
ing the customary principles relevant to its exercise, such as proportion-
ality and necessity.3 5 Aside from the case of self-defence, however, the
Charter represents the totality of the law on the use of force. To be
lawful, "authorization" of States to use force to restore international
peace and security must be contemplated by the Charter as a method by
which the Security Council can exercise its enforcement powers. But
what conditions such use of force apart from the Security Council
itself? 36 Do States acting under Security Council authorization need to
30. The relevant resolutions, although not specifying the Article under which they were
adopted, all stipulate that the Security Council is acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. For
details of these resolutions, see supra note 1.
31. The Persian Gulf conflict can be distinguished to some extent since in that conflict,
it was arguable that the coalition allies were acting in collective self-defence. Thus, an
adverse finding as to the ability of the Security Council to "authorize" enforcement action
would not have resulted in an unlawful use of force. Such an alternative is not available in
the subsequent actions of States under such "authorizing" resolutions.
32. The assertion by some commentators of the unilateral right to use force on the
grounds of humanitarian intervention is the only exception to this consensus. See, e.g.,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973);
FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAWS AND MORAL-
ITY (1988). Although the existence of the right to self-defence in international law is
uncontroversial, what that right encompasses is the subject of endless debate. See, e.g., DEREK
W. BowETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); Brownlie, supra note 11, at
264-80; D.W. Greig, Self-Defence and the Security Council: What does Article 51 Mean?, 40
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 366 (1991). See generally THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
USE OF FORCE (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986).
33. Compare this to the situation with respect to the ius in bello. The U.N. Charter does
not deal with the ius in bello as such. Its provisions do not affect directly States' obligations
in relation to the principles of humanitarian law. These continue to be found in other conven-
tional documents and in the principles of customary international law. The provisions of the
ius in bello are incidentally affected, however, in relation to Article 43 forces by the com-
bined operation of Articles 25 and 103 of the U.N. Charter which can impact on a State's
humanitarian law treaty obligations. See discussion infra notes 121-22 and accompanying
text.
34. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 94, 102 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. But note that the Court con-
firmed that the present content of the customary right of self-defence was as "confirmed and
influenced by the Charter." Id. at 94.
35. Id. at 94, 103.
36. Under the Charter the Security Council in theory can always control any exercise of
force by Member States; whether that action is by way of self-defence or pursuant to Security
Council authorization.
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take into account considerations of necessity and proportionality in
carrying out their mandates? The answers must lie in the provisions of
the Charter itself as, unlike self-defence, collective enforcement action is
solely a creation of the Charter. Thus we must consider the Security
Council's own obligations in relation to limits on the permissible use of
force, as these will determine the obligations of States acting under its
authorization.37
The general question of limits on the Security Council is by no
means new. Since the adoption of the Charter, the question of whether
there are limits to the measures which the Security Council can adopt to
fulfill its primary role of restoring international peace and security; and
the related questions, of whether the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Security Council under Article 39 is justiciable and in what forum, 38 has
from time to time attracted some attention from commentators. 39 Recent
37. Once again the principles of State responsibility and their application to international
organizations becomes relevant. Generally speaking, if States are acting as subsidiary organs
of the United Nations, the responsibility, if any, for these forces lies with the organization.
Clearly, however, there are some circumstances in which the corporate veil of the organiza-
tion will be lifted and States will incur individual responsibility for their actions. See
Komenov, supra note 10, at 188-89.
If it is accepted that the Security Council is governed by principles of international law,
then, under the general rules of attribution, the effective control of the forces supplied to the
United Nations is an indispensable condition precedent to liability of the organization. Un-
doubtedly the Security Council has theoretical control over such forces, but is that enough?
The potential for difficulties in this area is exacerbated by the Security Council's recent
practice of delegating to States, in particular the United States, the determination of what
amounts to "all necessary means." This lack of Council control was a cause for concern for
some States during the Persian Gulf conflict. It is arguable that the Coalition forces exceeded
the Security Council mandate. This is irrespective of whether one takes the view that this was
an action in collective self-defence sanctioned by the Council or an enforcement action. See
John Quigley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order
or Disorder?, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 25-28 (1992). China also expressed concern over
this issue of control in the debates leading up to Resolution 794 establishing the Unified Task
Force (UNITAF), a US led coalition established under Chapter VII to establish a secure
environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia.
The argument that the Security Council retains ultimate control over States acting under
its authorization belies the reality that the Council does not have the established mechanisms
for overseeing such operations, and that the United States is not ready to relinquish control
over its forces to the Council. In fact, no effort has been made to follow the practice in the
Korean conflict where the fiction was maintained that it was a United Nations operation.
38. As W. Michael Reisman writes, "[t]he practical questions, then, are: who will review
Security Council actions and who will determine the content, if any, of the arguably limiting
legal principles." W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 92 (1993).
39. The actions of the Security Council in relation to Southern Rhodesia gave rise to
some debate over these issues. See Rosalyn Higgins, International Law, Rhodesia and the
UN, 23 WORLD TODAY 94 (1967); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia
and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1968). See also Oscar Schachter, The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the
General Assembly, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 960 (1964); Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of Interna-
tional Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1970)
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Security Council action has revived interest in these topics. After all, the
Security Council is a treaty body and dependent on treaty provisions.
What then are the possible sources of any limits to Security Council
military enforcement actions?
1. Article 1(1) of the U.N. Charter
It is clear that the U.N. Charter does not envisage the Security
Council as being bound by customary rules developed in the context of
the use of force between States. For a start, those rules are irrelevant as
the Council does not resort to force in self-defence. Furthermore, even if
the reference in Article 1(1) to international law is regarded as encom-
passing general principles as well as customary rules of international
law, and thus perhaps of more potential relevance to the Security Coun-
cil,' the coverage of Article 1 is restricted to Chapter VI measures.
Under Article 1(1), one of the purposes of the Charter with which the
Security Council must comply by virtue of Article 24(2) is:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and remov-
al of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggres-
sion or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and interna-
tional law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
Clearly the reference to international law is limited to whei the Security
Council is acting under Chapter VI. The implications from this para-
graph are two-fold. First, that the Security Council, when acting under
Chapter VII, can derogate from the existing rules of international law in
its actions dealing with threats to the peace in order to restore interna-
tional peace and security. As a general proposition this conclusion has
never been seriously in doubt and Article 103 confirms it. But are there
no limits?4' Second, it is possible to infer from Article 1(1) that if the
[hereinafter Settlement of Disputes]. Moreover, it appearsto have been assumed that the use
of force in the Korean conflict had to bear some relationship to the aims. See infra notes
79-82 and accompanying text.
40. By this, I am referring to the argument set out below that proportionality and
necessity are general principles of international law that apply to all uses of force. See part
I.B.
41. The issue is far more significant in the context of Article 41 measures as there are
many principles of international law that could be involved. The idea that general interna-
tional law constrains the actions of the Security Council is not a novel argument. In Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21)
(Request for Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Namibia Case], Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in
his dissenting opinion, stated that even when acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
Winter 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Charter had intended otherwise to restrict the Security Council in any
way, it would have made provision to that effect. Thus, a futher exami-
nation of the provisions of the Charter is necessary to determine if these
implications can be displaced.
2. Article 42 of the U.N. Charter
In relation to military enforcement actions, there are the words of
Article 42 itself, which require the Security Council to satisfy itself that
the "measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate" before actions involving military force are
taken. Moreover, it can only take such actions as are "necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security." Thus, Article 42
may be viewed as providing a treaty test for necessity and proportionali-
ty.42 The question remains whether these words are perceived as impos-
ing legal limitations.43
The issue of whether the terms of the Charter constitute legal crite-
ria has arisen primarily in the context of Article 39, and whether its
requirements of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression must be objectively satisfied. There is con-
siderable support for the view that the determination by the Security
Council under this provision is a matter within its own discretion and is
non-justiciable. 44 This decision is regarded as incorporating a political
Security Council was subject to general principles of international law. Id. at 220 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice).
Other commentators support this approach. See, e.g., Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 10,
at 90-94; Bernhard Graefrath, Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court - The Libyan
Case, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 184, 200-05 (1993); Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International
Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1970);
Geoffrey R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and the World Court, 34 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1, 33-39 (1993).
42. See discussion infra note 74 and accompanying text.
43. Of course such an analysis is only valid to the extent that military enforcement
actions are seen as sourced in Article 42. It is, however, hard to accept that the situations in
which the Security Council can "authorize" States to use force are wider than its powers to
take action itself under Article 42.
44. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 66 (1963); Rosalyn Higgins, Settlement of
Disputes, supra note 39, at 16; HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 735 (1964); Vera Gowlland-Debbas,
The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the
Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643, 662 n.103 (1994). See also Lockerbie
Case, supra note 13, 1992 I.C.J. at 176 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325
(Sept. 13) [hereinafter Genocide Case], Judge Lauterpacht, after rejecting the view that the
Security Council acts free of all legal restraint, stated:
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rather than a legal judgement. 45 Recently this issue has become more
controversial with the assumption of jurisdiction by the Council under
Chapter VII in the Lockerbie Case, the civil conflict in Somalia, and the
unrest in Haiti. There is an increasing perception that there must be
some limits to the Security Council's assessment of the situation. 4
Some would argue that it is difficult without more to envisage that
the assessments in Article 42 are to be regarded as legal questions any
more than the determination under Article 39. There is, however, no
need to be drawn into the legal/political dichotomy that is integral to
any discussion of Article 39. The determination to become seized of the
situation and any subsequent action taken under Chapter VII are two
different questions. 47 It is one thing to allow the Security Council to
determine its own jurisdiction and quite another to conclude that in the
exercise of its powers it is similarly unrestrained. A distinction thus
exists between, on the one hand, the jurisdiction of a treaty body such
there can be no less doubt that it does not embrace any right of the Court to
substitute its discretion for that of the Security Council in determining the existence
of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, or the
political steps to be taken following such a determination.
Id. at 439 (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht). However, there is support for the
view that the powers of the United Nations cannot be used in an arbitrary or abusive fashion.
Gowlland-Debbas argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights can be discerned in certain
dissenting or separate opinions of the International Court of Justice in relation to the exercise
of discretionary power by organs of the United Nations. Gowlland-Debbas, supra, at 663.
45. See KELSEN, supra note 44, at 735. It is not suggested that political and legal ques-
tions are inherently different or in any way mutually exclusive. In this context, the division
comes down to what questions the organs of the United Nations will tolerate as having a legal
dimension.
46. For a critical analysis of the Court's conclusion that the situation in relation to the
Lockerbie suspects amounted to a threat to the peace, see Graefrath, supra note 41, at
195-97, 199. "[L]imitations on the powers of the Security Council are necessary because of
the all too great ease with which any acutely controversial international situation can be repre-
sented as involving a latent threat to peace and security, even where it is really too remote
genuinely to constitute one." Id. at 197 (quoting Judge Fitzmaurice, dissenting opinion in the
Namibia Case, supra note 41). See also Thomas M. Franck, The Security Council and
'Threats to the Peace': Some Remarks on Remarkable Recent Developments, in PEACE-
KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUN-
CIL 83 (Rend-Jean Dupuy ed., 1993).
For an argument based on limits derived from Art. 24(1), see Benedetto Conforti, Le
pouvoir discritionnaire du Conseil de sdcuritd en mati~re de constatation d'une menace
contre la paix, d'une rupture de la paix ou d'un acte d'agression, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra, at 51, 57. See also Michael Bothe, Les limits
des pouvoirs du Conseil de sicuriti, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, supra, at 67, 69.
47. As Judge Shahabuddeen stated in the Lockerbie Case, supra note 13, "[t]he question
... is whether a decision of the Security Council may override the legal rights of States, and,
if so, whether there are any limitations on the power of the Council to characterize a situation
as one justifying the making of a decision entailing such consequences." Id. at 142 (separate
opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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as the Security Council which, for any number of reasons may be
viewed as controlled by political means and, on the other hand, actions
taken by such an organ that have always been regarded as having a
legal dimension. The use of force in both municipal and international
law traditionally has always constituted a primary area for legal regula-
tion.4s This is merely another way of saying that the Council operates to
some extent within the general system of law that governs all interna-
tional legal persons. The issue, however, is not quite that straightfor-
ward. Since States agreed that the Charter was to constitute the code on
the ius ad bellum, the-intention of the Charter is still the governing
factor.
Even if one accepts the view that the words of Article 42 standing
alone cannot constitute words of legal limitation, a similar result that
will allow the limitations expressed therein to constrain the Council's
actions can be reached by a somewhat different analysis. It can be
argued that the Charter leaves open, and perhaps even contemplates, the
possibility of applying appropriate general principles of international
law49 to military enforcement actions by the Security Council that are
consistent with the other principles of the Charter.5'
3. Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter
Article 24 confers on the Security Council the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 24(2)
states that the Security Council, in discharging its duties under Article
24(1), "shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations." By virtue of Article 1(3), one of the purposes of the
Charter is to promote and encourage respect for human rights. This
reference to human rights could be interpreted as indicating that all
Security Council action must be consistent with the standards of interna-
tional law that have been developed in this area and that regulate all
actors in the international arena. To the extent the Security Council
operates within the general system of law, it is subject to appropriate
48. The regulation of the resort to force was regarded by some writers as a fundamental
component of a legal system. The failure of international law at one stage.in its development
to regulate the resort to force was regarded by these commentators as an indication that the
system was not legal. See the discussion of this issue by HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY
OF LAW AND STATE 331-32 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945) (20th Century Legal Philosophy
series Vol. 1, 1945).
49. 1 am referring here to general principles of international law recognized by civilized
nations in Art. 38 (l)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See discussion
infra note 67 and accompanying text.
50. A similar argument could be made in the context of Article 41 and is suggested by
Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 10, at 91. See also Watson, supra note 41, at 33.
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principles of international law. The reference to human rights in Article
1(3) provides the link for the argument that places the Security Council
within the general international legal system.
Certainly a further connection has to be established between propor-
tionality and necessity and the reference to human rights in that Article
before they can be regarded as determinants of the legitimate use of
force by the Security Council. Moreover, a technical approach to the
expression "human rights" as it appears in Article 1(3) could be inimical
to importing broader based humanitarian principles into the legal frame-
work of the Security Council when it is undertaking military enforce-
ment actions. These are not, however, insuperable obstacles. In the ius
ad bellum, the requirements of proportionality and necessity have tradi-
tionally been regarded as based on considerations relating to territory,
that is, as limiting the damage to a State's territory to what is warranted
in the circumstances." The aspect of these principles of direct relevance
to the protection of individuals as opposed to States has been reserved
for the ius in bello, where proportionality at least52 has long been re-
garded as a customary principle of international law.53 The sharp distinc-
tion traditionally drawn between a State's territory and its people, how-
ever, is no longer in keeping with current notions of the role of interna-
tional law. After all, what is a State without its people? The argument I
am putting forward here is another aspect of developing critiques of the
limitations of sovereignty, currently constructed in international law as a
reflection of political power rather than justice.' Thus, I suggest that the
51. This is the general view of commentators. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, Self-
Defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A
TIME OF PERPLEXITY 273, 278 n.22 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989). See also Watson, supra note
41, at 38.
52. Necessity by its nature is inapplicable once the decision to resort to force is taken.
See infra note 66 and accompanying text. Thus, since it is not a component of the ius in
bello, there is all the more reason why its role in the ius ad bellum must be regarded as
humanitarian in nature.
53. See Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 391, 397-401, 408 (1993). See generally Daniel Bardonnet, Quelque Observations
sur le Principe de Proportionnalito en Droit International, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
DANS UN MONDE EN MUTATION 995, 1024-27 (Manuel Rama-Montaldo ed., 1994).
54. Writers such as Thomas Franck and Michael Reisman, in stressing the importance of
the behavior of the State toward its peoples, are at the forefront of breaking down the barriers
of State sovereignty and bringing the individual closer to being a subject of international law.
See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990). These critiques themselves are limited as
they take no account of feminist perspectives. See Karen Knopp, Re/Statements: Feminism
and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 TRANS. L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 293
(1993). See also Theoretical Perspectives on the Transformation of Sovereignty, 88 PRoc. AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 1 (1994).
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reference to human rights in the purposes of the Charter not only must
be broad enough to include within its compass principles that have the
potential to provide very real protection to individuals in that most
destructive of activities - armed conflict - but should have a meaning
outside the narrow context of how a State treats its own subjects. This
approach is warranted by the overall context of the reference to human
rights in Article 1(3), emphasizing as it does the resolution of problems
of a humanitarian character and the promotion of fundamental freedoms.
The implications of this approach are undoubtedly radical. Tradi-
tionally the function of the regime of human rights in relations between
States during armed conflict has been performed by the ius in bello.
Thus, it could be argued that even if an expanded definition is given to
Article 1(3), it should be restricted to applying the provisions of the ius
in bello to the Security Council. It is becoming increasingly apparent,
however, that to rely on the ius in bello to provide real protection to the
civilian population in times of armed conflict is a failure to acknowl-
edge the far greater potential of the ius ad bellum to achieve this goal.55
The Lockerbie Case has focussed attention on the extent to which
the Security Council operates within the general system of international
law,56 but is of little guidance here as it deals with measures taken by
the Council under Article 41." The potential for actions of the Security
Council under Article 41 to conflict with rights of States under general
international law is significant as the Lockerbie Case illustrates. 58 Thus,
the question as to whether the Council is subject to the requirements of
international law could be of great importance. On the other hand, with
military enforcement action under Chapter VII, the fact that the Charter
alone is the law on the topic simplifies the matter, While not directly
relevant, dealing as it does with non-forcible measures by the Security
55. See Judith G. Gardam, Noncombatant Immunity and the Gulf Conflict, 33 VA. J.
INT'L L. 813 (1992).
56. The point was not directly raised as the issue under consideration by the Court in the
Lockerbie Case was the effect of a Security Council decision that conflicted with a State's
existing treaty rights and duties. In the view of the Court, Article 103 of the Charter resolved
this issue in favor of the Security Council. See Gowliand-Debbas, supra note 44, at 644-48.
57. See SC Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
58. Although the rights that Libya claimed as incompatible with the Security Council
actions were derived from the Montreal Convention, Lockerbie Case, supra note 13, 1992
I.C.J. at 117-18, there was a general principle of international law that was relevant: namely,
the right of a sovereign State to refuse to extradite its nationals. As Thomas M. Franck notes,
"[iut is interesting to speculate what might have happened had Libya been a party to the
Court's mandatory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of [the ICJ] Statute and had it brought its
action 'under general international law' against Britain, as another party to 36(2), rather than
under the Montreal Convention." Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who Is
the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 522 (1992).
[Vol. 17:285
Security Council Military Enforcement Action
Council, 9 the Lockerbie Case is nevertheless instructive. Some of the
judgements indicate possible approaches to the more general point as to
whether the Security Council is subject to legal restraints and, moreover,
the important question of the respective roles of the Court and the
Council under the Charter system.6° There is nothing, however, in the
judgements that indicates that the Security Council under Chapter VII
operates without any legal restraints. The matter is left open.
In conclusion, in the context of military enforcement measures under
the Charter, there appears to be no justification for the view that the
Security Council is at liberty to completely disregard the purposes and
principles of the Charter, and even less for the denial that it operates to
a certain extent within the general system of international law. 61 More-
59. Article 103 is not relevant either in this context as it is predicated on a conflict with
existing treaty rights and duties between the States concerned. There are no independent
obligations of States under the existing ius ad bellum, treaty or otherwise. Their legal position
is dependent on that of the Security Council itself. Thus, no clash of obligations can arise.
60. The question of ultra vires was not in issue in the Lockerbie Case since the Court, in
reaching its decision, assumed a valid obligation on States, an approach consistent with the
nature of an application for provisional measures. The broader theoretical issues were
encapsulated by Judge Shahabuddeen:
Are there any limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In the equilibrium of
forces underpinning the structure of the United Nations within the evolving interna-
tional order, is there any conceivable point beyond which a legal issue may proper-
ly arise as to the competence of the Security Council to produce such overriding
results? If there are any limits, what are those limits and what body, if other than
the Security Council, is competent to say what these limits are?
Lockerbie Case, supra note 13, 1992 I.C.J. at 142 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
With the exception of Judge Weeramantry, no member of the Court indicated that the
Security Council decisions under Chapter VII were beyond the scrutiny of the Court. In fact,
several judges indicated that the Court had a definite role to play in relation to the Security
Council but not in the particular fact situation before the Court. See, e.g., declaration of Act-
ing President Oda, id. at 129; declaration of Judge Ni, id. at 133-34; separate opinion of
Judge Lachs, id. at 138.
After a careful analysis of the choices available to the Court, Thomas M. Franck
concludes that the Court somewhat tentatively adopted an approach that assumed an implicit
right to review Chapter VII decisions. Franck, supra note 58, at 521. This view is shared by
other commentators. See Graefrath, supra note 41, at 185. For a careful examination of this
issue, see Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 44, at 663-65. Compare the view of W. Michael
Reisman who is very critical of the approach taken by the Court in analyzing the fundamental
issues before it, alleging that "the majority judgement manifests no understanding of the
specific role requirements of the Council .... [n]or ... was the Court solicitous of its own
complementary role." REISMAN, supra note 38, at 94.
61. As commentators have pointed out, the new role of the Security Council must be set
against the background of other developments in international law, particularly the emphasis
on humanitarian values and human rights. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 10, at 91-93, suggests
that the Security Council cannot, as she puts it, "hide behind the corporate veil" and remain
indifferent to the developments in human rights and humanitarian values that are influencing
the work of the International Law Commission on unilateral countermeasures. See Third Report
on State Responsibility, Int'l L. Comm'n, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/440/Add.1 (1991) (report
by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz); Fourth Report on State Responsibility, Int'l L. Comm'n, 44th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. AICN.4/444/Add. 1 (1992) (report by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz). See also Watson, supra
note 41, at 38.
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over, there is a convincing argument that the presence of Article 103 in
the Charter has no impact on the need for the Security Council to com-
ply with general international law in its actions under Article 41. It is
not necessarily inconsistent for the Security Council to override other
treaty obligations of States while remaining bound itself by customary
rules. States have differing treaty obligations but customary obligations
bind all States equally. To allow some States to avoid Security Council
resolutions on the basis of inconsistent treaty obligations is inappropriate
in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security.
It would be regrettable if the attempts of the Security Council to
perform an effective role within the overall goals of the Charter in these
areas should become part of the problem rather than the solution. 62 A
textual analysis of the terms of the Charter is not going to provide the
limits to the Security Council's military enforcement powers. As one
commentator writes, the limitations come from the system viewed as a
whole.63 Any restraints will be derived from the increasing emphasis on
human rights and humanitarian values that increasingly constitute the
fundamental aim of the entire international legal system. As stated in
Article 24(2) of the Charter, one of the purposes ,and principles of the
United Nations to which the Security Council is bound is the promotion
and encouragement of respect for human rights. Surely a State whose
population is devastated by Security Council enforcement action seem-
ingly out. of proportion to the restoration of international peace and
security can argue that the Council has breached the legal limitations on
its powers that require it to act in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter? In what circumstances and to what extent the
International Court of Justice will regard itself as having a role to play
in determining the applicable limits remains to be seen. This is not,
however, determinative of the question whether there are limits to
Security Council enforcement action. As international lawyers are well
aware, judicial review does not play the role in international law that it
does in most municipal systems. The regulation of the behavior of actors
in the international community is a much more subtle process. The very
debate ensuing at the moment as to the role of the Security Council in
the new world order is part of this process.'
62. The situation in Somalia is a good illustration of how a humanitarian action can
ultimately cost the lives of civilians. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 19-20.,
See also Bothe, Peacekeeping and the Use of Force, supra note 25, at 4-5.
63. Conforti, supra note 46, at 55. See also Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 44, at 667 and
infra note 116 and accompanying text.
64. Neither do the inherent difficulties in subjecting concepts such as necessity and
proportionality to judicial review affect their legal status. See part I.B.3.
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As I have argued, the legal position in relation to the Security
Council and military enforcement actions is not on all fours with that
governing its other functions under Chapter VII. To limit the Security
Council in its military enforcement powers requires a determination of
not only whether the Council operates within a legal framework when
exercising those powers, but also whether there are any general princi-
ples of law that might arguably apply in such circumstances. Thus far
the argument is that the reference to the promotion and encouragement
of respect for human rights in the purposes of the United Nations pro-
vides the basis for the conclusion that the Security Council, in its mili-
tary enforcement powers, operates subject to restraints derived from
relevant and appropriate general principles of international law. The
following section of this paper considers what these might be.
B. The Scope of the Ius Ad Bellum in Military Enforcement Actions
It was clearly not anticipated that the Security Council, when deal-
ing with a threat to international peace and security, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression, must consider all possible rules of international law
before it acts. This suggestion is not only negated by the terms of the
Charter itself but is politically unworkable. The previous discussion
indicates that in my view, limitations that have a humanitarian compo-
nent are the most likely to be regarded as prerequisites to valid Security
Council action. A consideration of the development of the law on the
use of force indicates that the twin requirements of necessity and pro-
portionality have long been determinants of the legitimacy of the use of
force.65 Necessity relates to whether the situation warrants the use of
armed force, proportionality determines the amount of force that can
legitimately be used to achieve the goal.' Although the development of
65. Proportionality and necessity are in fact general principles with differing applications,
one of which is in the area of the use of force. For an analysis of proportionality in a wider
framework, see D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 295, 322-27 (199,4), and in relation to necessity, see BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 58-77 (1953).
66. International law reflects the current view of States that in relation to unilateral State
action, the overall evil of war always outweighs the good except in cases of self-defence. This
balancing process is continued in the legal requirements of necessity and proportionality that
determine a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence. Unlike the assessment of propor-
tionality, which is an ongoing process throughout the conflict, the assessment of necessity
occurs at the time the initial decision is made to resort to force. Once that decision is made,
the role of necessity is complete and the ongoing conduct of the campaign is determined by
the requirements of proportionality.
Many commentators, while acknowledging these two requirements, tend to deal with
them as if they were one. See generally Greenwood, supra note 51. On the other hand, some
writers address all questions of necessity and proportionality under the umbrella of propor-
tionality. See, e.g., Marc Weller, The Kuwait Crisis: A Survey of Some Legal Issues, 3 AFR. J.
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these principles as legal requirements has previously occurred primarily
in the context of self-defence,67 there is no reason to suppose that the
scope of these principles is so limited. They are general principles of
law that govern all uses of force, whether individual or through collec-
tive security systems.6" Moreover, they both have a substantial humani-
tarian basis.69 Before turning, however, to a closer consideration of
proportionality and necessity and their content in the context of the
Security Council, it is somewhat disingenuous to assert the existence of
any general principles of international law without acknowledging the
controversy that surrounds the issue as to whether they constitute a
legitimate source of international law.70 Readers will be familiar with the
debate in this area.71 It is not proposed to retraverse that ground to any
extent. The argument of this paper, however, that human rights and
humanitarian principles are legal constraints on the Security Council
through the doctrine of proportionality for example, does not depend on
the importation of rules from national law,72 but is based on extrapolat-
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 27 (1991). As Oscar Schachter writes, "proportionality is linked to
necessity: acts done in self-defence must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking
them." Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10 YALE J. INT'L L.
291, 292 (1985). For a discussion of the role that proportionality plays in the context of the
use of force, see Gardam, supra note 53. See also Bardonnet, supra note 53, at 1028-32.
67. The early beginnings of necessity and proportionality as legal principles are in fact
found in the idea of self-preservation. Bin Cheng, in his work on general principles of
international law, identifies necessity and self-defence (including the Caroline requirements of
necessity and proportionality) as components of the general principle of self-preservation.
CHENG, supra note 65, at 69-97.
68. See Bothe, supra note 46, at 78-79. See also Watson, supra note 41. Compare Greig,
supra note 65, at 322-27 (discussing whether the principle of proportionality can be viewed
as a general principle of international law).
69. For the contrary view that proportionality and necessity in the ius ad bellum are
based on territorial considerations, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
70. See GODEFRIDUS J.H VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 131-33 (1983).
71. Commentators differ as to whether general principles of international law are a
separate source of international law, or are derived solely from existing customary and
conventional rules. The majority view is that they are an independent source, but further
disagreement exists as to whether they are restricted to principles of national law, or also
include principles of international law. Many commentators accept the interpretation that the
words "general principles" in Article 38(l)(c) are not limited to principles of national law. See
Johan G. Lammers, General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, in ESSAYS ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 53, 66-69 (Frits Kalshoven et al.
eds., 1980). For a discussion of the general principles of international law, see VAN HOOF,
supra note 70, at 131-67. See generally CHENG, supra note 65.
72. Although proportionality is accepted as part of the national law of a majority of
States, Bothe, supra note 46, at 76-78, the appropriate analogy from national law is not so
much the law on the right of individual self-defence, but the rules regulating the use of
collective force by 'representatives of the State, such as the police. With some notable
exceptions, most jurisdictions place legal restraints on the amount of force that may be used
by such individuals in their public capacity.
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ing existing principles of international law governing activities between
States to an international organization."
Proportionality and necessity are both concepts present in the Char-
ter and arguably constitute legal limitations. The Charter, therefore, in
effect provides a treaty test for these principles.
1. Proportionality
The only actions involving the use of force contemplated by the
Charter are those taken to maintain or restore international peace and
security under Article 42.14 In the face of a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression, Articles 39 and 42 read together consti-
tute the yardstick for determining the application of proportionality, that
is, the legitimate ends against which forceful actions are to be assessed.
The same result is achieved in one of two ways: by either regarding the
words to "restore international peace and security" as words of legal
limitation, or, in the alternative, by placing the Council in the general
system of law in which all international legal persons operate. Under the
latter option, the Security Council, like other international legal persons,
would be governed by the requirement that all use of force must be
proportionate to its aim, and finding the determining criteria in a con-
ventional source.
It can be argued that when the Security Council decision in question
is authorizing the use of force, presumably as a last resort to restore
international peace and security, it is somewhat unrealistic to discuss
sovereign rights of States.75 To some extent a State whose conduct
attracts this type of sanction might be regarded as having temporarily
73. This approach of relying on principles of international law to fill the gaps in conven-
tional and customary law is particularly appropriate in the context of international organiza-
tions. For example, Sir Humphrey Waldock refers to the willingness of the International Court
of Justice to rely on general principles of international law to supplement the undeveloped
general law of international legal institutions. Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public
International Law, 106 RECUEIL DEs CouRs 5, 60-61 (1962). In the Reparation Case, the
International Court of Justice observed that "[t]he Court is here faced with a new situation.
The questions to which it gives rise can only be solved by realizing that the situation is
dominated by the provisions of the Charter considered in the light of the principles of
international law." Reparation Case, supra note 10, 1949 I.C.J. at 182.
74. Even if it is accepted that Article 42 of the U.N. Charter is not the source of the
recent practice of authorizing States to use force, see supra note 8 and accompanying text,
there is no reason to suppose that this aim of maintaining and restoring international peace
and security is not equally applicable when the Security Council is delegating its enforcement
powers to States rather than exercising them itself.
75. It is the deprivation of the rights of a sovereign State that has led to some disquiet
about the decision of the Court in the Lockerbie Case. Acting President Oda commented on
the issue of sovereign rights in regard to extradition in his declaration. Lockerbie Case, supra
note 13, 1992 I.C.J. at 130-31 (declaration of Acting President Oda).
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forfeited its sovereign rights based on such considerations as territorial
integrity.76 But to what extent? Has it also forfeited rights that relate to
the protection of its citizens rather than to the State in its sovereign
capacity? This is not the result in the case of self-defence, even if there
has been a flagrant breach of international law by a State. Why should it
be the case under the collective security provisions of the Charter?
Moreover, as I have argued, there are difficulties with regarding propor-
tionality, even in its ius ad bellum sense, as dictated solely by the
requirements of territorial integrity.77 Certainly there is a distinction in
this context between the basis of proportionality in the ius ad bellum
and the ius in bello, with only the latter traditionally derived from
humanitarian considerations. 78 However, I would argue that nowadays
proportionality in the context of the ius ad bellum has a humanitarian
component, namely to achieve a reasonable balance between the
achievement of the legitimate goals under the Charter and the anticipat-
ed loss of life and suffering of those involved, particularly civilians. So
viewed, proportionality fits within the analysis that certain restraints on
the Security Council are consistent with the overall tenor of the Charter.
The view that there are limits to the powers of the United Nations
when taking military enforcement action is supported by the Korean
conflict79 and to a lesser extent by the Gulf conflict.8° Moreover, that
these limits were perceived in some quarters as legal limits is clear from
the following passage from Bowett:
Whereas, traditionally, a State waging war was entitled to do so to
the stage of complete annihilation and subjugation of the other
side, it can scarcely be maintained that United Nations action can
be pursued so far. Such "collective" or "enforcement" action, as
distinct from war, is limited to the measures necessary to resist
aggression and to maintain and restore international peace and
76. This is clear from the wording of Art. 2(7) of the U.N. Charter which excludes
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States from the province of the United Nations
except when the Security Council is acting under Chapter VII.
77. See discussion supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
78. See Gardam, supra note 53, at 394-403 (discussing the basis of proportionality in the
ius in bello).
79. See BOWETT, supra note 6, at 43-45.
80. Any analysis of the Persian Gulf conflict is complicated by the fact that the legal
basis for the use of force was arguably collective self-defence. See Oscar Schachter, Autho-
rized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65, 74-75 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,
1991) (concluding that there are limits to the measures the Security Council can take to
maintain and restore international peace and security). See generally Quigley, supra note 37.
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security. To this extent the United Nations can only wage a "limit-
ed" war, and it is evident that it is this precise question of the
constitutional limits on United Nation action which weighed heavi-
ly in the doubts of some United Nations members over the propri-
ety of crossing the 38th parallel.- quite apart from the political
desirability of that course. The ends of war and of United Nations
action thus differ.8'
Bowett concludes that although this action was constitutionally valid, he
could nevertheless envisage examples of United Nations actions that
could have gone "beyond the necessity and purposes of United Nations
action," such as the wholesale destruction by aerial attack of all the
major towns in North Korea.
8 2
The argument that some principles of international law may be
perceived as unduly fettering the Security Council in its role of main-
taining international peace and security does not apply to proportionali-
ty. The recognition that the legitimate ends for the use of force have
been changed by the Charter is sufficient to allow the Security Council
the scope to fulfill its mandate. The achievement of these aims does not
justify the use of any means.
2. Necessity
Turning to the question of necessity in collective enforcement
actions, the Charter system leaves to the Security Council the difficult
assessment of whether the overall good to be gained from the resort to
force is balanced by the overall evil in situations other than self-defence.
The assessment of necessity also incorporates factors based on respect
for human life and the suffering of the civilian population and is the sort
of limitation that, in common with proportionality, is consistent with the
overall aims of the Charter. Article 42 imposes two conditions which
must be satisfied before the Security Council can make a decision to use
force: (1) there must be a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression"83 within the meaning of Article 39; and, (2) the Coun-
cil must consider that "the measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate." In all other situations, the
use of force, irrespective of its benefits, is outside the jurisdiction of the
81. See BowETT, supra note 6, at 54-55.
82. l at 55. See also Reisman, supra note 18, at 76 (arguing that peacemaking will
tolerate much less collateral destruction than warmaking, a proportionality argument).
83. The significance of these words of limitation in Article 42 is lessened by the broad
interpretation that the Security Council has recently placed on the phrase "threat to the
peace." See, e.g., Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 3, at 251-56.
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Security Council. Thus the international community determined the
parameters of necessity in relation to Security Council action as the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion. However, in common with the right of self-defence in the case of
an armed attack, the use of force in response is not an automatic right.
84
The Security Council must first satisfy itself of the inadequacy of other
measures. Article 42, as with proportionality, provides a treaty test for
this general principle of international law. To what extent it differs from
the rule in relation to self-defence depends on the view one takes as to
the requirements of necessity in self-defence. The Charter makes it clear
that the consideration of all peaceful alternatives, one way of regarding
the law on self-defence, is not a prerequisite to the resort to non-pacific
means by the Council. Only measures pursuant to Article 41 are subject
to that requirement. It was this very issue that attracted a great deal of
comment in the Persian Gulf conflict although it was rarely identified
clearly as a legal question. 85 Nevertheless, the existence of this debate
indicates that there was a view among legal commentators that the
requirements of Article 41 are of some significance and cannot be
dismissed summarily. Interestingly, proportionality has not received the
same sort of critical attention, perhaps because its requirements are not
expressed so explicitly in Article 41.
3. Assessment of Proportionality and Necessity
It could be argued that proportionality and necessity are concepts
too imprecise to apply in any objective fashion to the complex situations
that can confront the Security Council in exercising its responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security. The assessment of
these requirements is undoubtedly a much more straightforward process
in the law of self-defence. 6 The prevailing view is that a State can only
84. There are differing views as to the requirements of necessity in self-defence. One
view is that an aggressor's armed attack automatically satisfies the test of necessity. Oscar
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1635 (1984).
Other commentators argue that despite the existence of an armed attack, the requirement of
necessity must still be considered. See, e.g., Judge Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth
Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. AICN.41318/ADD.5-7 (1980), reprinted in [1980]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 13, at 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1980/Add.I (Part 1). There is,
however, consensus that the right to respond in self-defence to an armed attack is limited in
time. See Schachter, supra note 66, at 292. Thus, there is an element of immediacy com-
prehended in the idea of necessity. The judgement in the Nicaragua Case, supra note 34,
1986 I.C.J. at 119, 122-23, is also consistent with the temporal limitation that is generally
accepted as qualifying the right to resort to self-defence in response to an armed attack.
85. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 37, at 5-10; Weston, supra note 29, at 528-32.
86. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg discussed the justiciability of self-
defence in the following terms: "whether action taken under the claim of self-defence was in
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legitimately use force in response to an armed attack to the degree
necessary to defend itself.8 7 The determination of the existence of an
armed attack and measures that qualify as defensive, although not
beyond dispute, are capable of being determined with some precision."8
In the Nicaragua Case, the only judicial precedent to consider the appli-
cation of the requirements of necessity and proportionality in the context
of self-defence under the Charter, the International Court of Justice had
little difficulty applying these concepts.89 In contrast, the restoration of
international peace and security is a much more nebulous concept. There
would be vast differences of opinion as to what actions were, for exam-
ple, proportionate to achieve this goal. It is in the area of "threats to the
peace" rather than breaches of the peace or acts of aggression that the
assessment of proportionality and necessity becomes extremely difficult,
particularly in light of the recent practice of the Security Council of
interpreting that phrase so widely. If the activity against which the
response must be judged is inherently vague, as is the case with a
"threat to the peace," the comparison with the means required by pro-
portionality becomes very complex. At the very least, the characteriza-
tion of the dispute as a threat to the peace would, generally speaking,
fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if
international law is ever to be enforced." I INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 208 (1947). See also Nicaragua Case, supra note 34, 1986
I.C.J. at 108, 112-14 (referring to the legal dimension of the right of self-defence under the
U.N. Charter).
87. As one would expect, there are considerable differences as to what amounts to
defensive actions. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 213-20
(2d ed. 1994); Greenwood, supra note 51.
88. For a consideration of what. constitutes an armed attack, see Nicaragua Case, supra
note 34, 1986 I.C.J. at 113-14. See also Ago, supra note 84, [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
at 69 (discussing what amounts to defensive action in the context of proportionality and self-
defence).
89. Admittedly, the facts before the Court in the Nicaragua Case could be regarded as
presenting relatively clear cut examples of disproportionate and unnecessary actions in the
context of self-defence, although this was not a view shared by Judge Schwebel. See Nicara-
gua Case, supra note 34, 1986 I.C.J. at 279 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel). In the
Nicaragua Case, the United States had alleged a right of collective self-defence in support of
El Salvador based on the provision of aid by Nicaragua to the armed opposition in that State.
The activities of the United States that came under scrutiny were the laying of mines in
Nicaraguan ports and some ten attacks involving the use of force on such targets as oil
installations. Id. at 48, 50 (for a discussion of the activities that the Court found were
established by the evidence and that it took into account in its assessment of proportionality).
The Court concluded "[w]hatever uncertainty may exist as to the exact scale of the aid
received by the Salvadorian armed opposition from Nicaragua, it is clear that these latter
United States activities in question could not have been proportionate to that aid." Id. at 122.
It appears, therefore, that both the choice of targets and the scale of the response led to the
conclusion of illegitimacy by the Court. On the issue of necessity, the Court found problem-
atic the time lapse between the actions alleged to provoke the response and the response
itself. Id. at 122-23.
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warrant a more restrained response in terms of the use of force than a
breach of the peace or act of aggression. Similarly, establishing the
requisite state of necessity to use military force would be a more signifi-
cant task in a situation that merely constitutes a threat to the peace as
opposed to a situation involving an act of aggression.
In conclusion, assuming the threshold question, as to whether the
Security Council acts to some extent within a legal framework when it
is exercising its military enforcement powers, is answered in the affir-
mative, then a consideration of the historical regulation of the use of
force indicates the primary position of necessity and proportionality as
determinants of the legitimacy of actions involving the use of force.
Their application to the emerging new system of forceful actions in-
volving the Security Council are not only appropriate but warranted by
elementary considerations of humanity.
II. MILITARY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND THE IUS IN BELLO
There are two main issues in relation to humanitarian law and the
enforcement actions of the Security Council that warrant examination.
There is the set of threshold questions, already considered in relation to
the ius ad bellum, as to if and when such actions become subject to
legal rules, what these are. Assuming this is the case, another character-
istic of Security Council activities poses distinct problems for humani-
tarian law, namely the effect of economic sanctions imposed by the
Council.
A. The Security Council and the Requirements of Humanitarian Law
The first issue to consider is whether the Security Council is gov-
erned by the requirements of international humanitarian law.' These
rules, unlike those of the ius ad bellum, operate independently of the
Charter. They are a separate body of rules that are theoretically unaf-
fected by the Charter's provisions. States continue to be bound in their
90. Although adopted after the Charter, neither the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 nor
for that matter the 1977 Protocols deal with the situation of humanitarian law and United
Nations forces. See the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; the Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N:T.S. 85; the Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; the Convention relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol I, supra note
3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610 (adopted on
June 8, 1977).
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relationships inter se according to their treaty commitments and the
relevant rules of customary international law. As a consequence, the
question of the relationship between the law of armed conflict and
enforcement actions is much more complex. Several situations have to
be distinguished: the position of the United Nations itself, the individual
States participating in the enforcement actions, and the State(s) against
which forceful action is taken. The focus of this paper is the obligations
of the United Nations. Arguably a conclusion that the Security Council
is not bound by principles of humanitarian law does not have the same
implications as in relation to the ius ad bellum. It is assumed by most
writers that States involved in military enforcement actions remain
bound by their individual obligations under the ius in bello.9' As we will
see, there are difficulties with this assumption. It is not beyond debate
that State forces are bound in Security Council sanctioned enforcement
actions by their legal obligations derived from the rules regulating inter-
State conflicts, even less so if Article 43 forces were established. More-
over, given the existence of such a force, the view that the contingents
involved retain their independent status when acting in accordance with
a Security Council decision insofar as the requirements of humanitarian
law are concerned activates Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter. The
Council could thus theoretically override States' treaty obligations. It is
thus important to determine the position of the Security Council itself.
Under the Charter system, the question of the relationship between
the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello arises both in relation to conflicts
between States and United Nations enforcement action. 92 In the context
of the exercise of force by the United Nations, it was suggested shortly
after the adoption of the Charter that these forces should only be re-
quired to comply with the laws of war as were fit for their purposes.93
There were basically two justifications provided for this view. One
position was that since the use of force was prohibited under the Char-
ter, any forcible action that the United Nations took would necessarily
91. See BOWETT, supra note 6, at 503-06; Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the
United Nations and Regional Organizations, supra note 80, at 76. Cf. SEYERSTED, supra note
16, at 90-126 (distinguishing between forces under United Nations command and forces
under national command).
92. For a discussion of the issue in the context of conflicts between States, see
BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 406 n.1.
93. See, e.g., Report of the American Society of International Law Committee on Legal
Problems of the UN, Should the Laws of War Apply to UN Enforcement Action?, reprinted in
46 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 216-20 (1952). See also GUENTER WEISSBERG, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 105 n.101 (1961).
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be in response to unlawful aggression.94 The other approach focused on
the compatibility of United Nations enforcement action with the concept
of warfare and the rules developed to regulate its conduct.95 For some
time after the adoption of the Charter this topic received a degree of
attention. The consensus, however, was against drawing such a distinc-
tion between United Nations forces and an aggressor State in relation to
the application of the principles of humanitarian law - the same posi-
tion that had been reached in relation to inter-state conflicts.96 The
growing emphasis on the humanitarian basis of these rules and the
increasing acceptance that their primary objective was to provide protec-
tion for individuals in armed conflict reinforced this approach.97 Thus it
seemed to be accepted that an unlawful aggressor was entitled to the
benefits of the ius in bello irrespective of whether the lawful parties' use
of force was by way of self-defence or by way of collective enforcement
action. 98 Certainly from the perspective of humanitarian law this is the
desirable position, but does it also represent the legal position?
Although the legal issues were never formally resolved, the policy
adopted in relation to United Nations peacekeeping forces, where the
issue has been of some practical importance, 99 was consistent with the
view that the United Nations should be bound to the extent necessary by
94. Bowett refers to this view as the "reprisal theory" and explains its strengths and
weaknesses. BOWETT, supra note 6, at 493-96.
95. Id. at 496-99.
96. See, e.g., Resolutions and Voeux Adopted by the Institute at its Zagreb Session (26
August-4 September 1971), 54 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL pt. 2, at
465-80 (1971). For the situation in relation to inter-State conflicts, see Protocol I, supra note
3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 6-7, 16 I.L.M. at 1396 (preamble to Protocol I). The principle of equal
application of the ius in bello has always been difficult to maintain in practice. For example,
despite its acceptance by the States involved, it came under considerable pressure in the
Persian Gulf conflict. See Gardam, supra note 53, at 410-12. See also Schachter, supra note
8, at 466.
97. Prior to the developments during this century that culminated in the outright ban on
the use of force in the Charter, the resort to war was a sovereign right of States. The law of
armed conflict played a secondary role to the law of war in regulating relationships between
States upon the outbreak of war. This latter body of law, through such institutions as belliger-
ency, neutrality, blockade and prize, minimized the disruption to States caused by war. It is
only this century, as a consequence of the ban on the use of force and the developing
emphasis on human rights, that the law of armed conflict has assumed a more prominent role
and an increasingly humanitarian aspect.
98. This position remains largely unchallenged by the Gulf conflict. See Henri
Meyrowitz, La guerre du Golfe et le droit des conflits armis, 96 REVUE GINIRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 551, 553-54 (1992).
99. Until recently, peacekeeping has been predicated on there being no active hostilities
taking place and no situation of armed conflict between the United Nations forces and other
parties. Given these conditions, the applicability of the provisions of the law of armed conflict
was a peripheral concern. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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the same principles of international humanitarian law as States. I°° Since
there were difficulties with the United Nations becoming a party to
these conventional rules flowing from its status as an organization,'0 '
there was necessarily a distinction drawn between the conventional and
customary rules. Otherwise the view prevailed that "[iut is uncontested
that the United Nations is bound by the customary rules of IHL when
engaged in hostilities."'0 2
The legal basis underlying this assertion, however, has always been
somewhat unclear. Presumably it is on the basis that the Security Coun-
cil is bound by principles of general international law. Moreover, nation-
al contingents as a matter of practice regard themselves as bound by
their States' treaty obligations. Derek Bowett writes that "it is difficult
[apart from the unlawful aggressor theory which, in my view, he quite
correctly finds unsustainable] to posit any persuasive theories that would
release a State's military forces from the binding force of the laws of
100. There are many works detailing approaches that have been taken to the question of
United Nations peacekeeping forces and international humanitarian law. See, e.g., Schindler,
supra note 16; Yves Sandoz, The Application of Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of
the United Nations Organization, 206 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 274, 283 (1978). The practice
evolved of negotiating agreements between the United Nations, the host State and the States
supplying peacekeepers that determined such matters as the status of the forces involved,
issues as to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and the application of humanitarian law to the
activities of these forces. For full details of these agreements in relation to peacekeeping
operations, see 1-4 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: 1946-1967 (1969,
1970, 1980, 1981). These agreements resolved the legal issues between the United Nations
and the supplying States as well as many of the issues in relation to third parties, since the
latter would in most cases be covered by the agreements with the host State.
101. The United Nations has sufficient international personality to undertake rights and
duties, including treaty obligations, in international law. See supra note 10. On the status of
the United Nations generally, see WEISSBERG, supra note 93. See also Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Third Session (4 May-24 June 1980),
reprinted in [1981] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A1I981/Add.I (Part
2) (reporting on the work of the International Law Commission on the general topic of
international organizations and treaties); FELICE MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 13-19 (1986) (discussing theories regarding the basis of
treaty-making capacity of international organizations); 2 HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 696-725 (1972) (analyzing the elements of agreements used by
international organizations in their external relations).
However, there are particular difficulties in applying humanitarian law treaties to the
United Nations. Bowett comprehensively describes the legal and practical obstacles to such a
course of action. See BOWETT, supra note 6, at 505-15. See also Umesh Palwankar, Applica-
bility of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-keeping Forces, 294 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 227, 231-34 (1993).
102. Schindler, supra note 16, at 526. But compare SEYERSTED, supra note 16, at 187,
201, 314, 395. For a more cautious assessment, see BOWETT, supra note 6, at 506. See also
Article 2 of the 1971 Zagreb Resolution, supra note 10, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
at 373, which states that "[t]he humanitarian rules of the law of armed conflict apply to the
United Nations as of right, and they must be complied with in all circumstances by United
Nations Forces which are engaged in hostilities."
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war, as a matter of law, simply because they are engaged in fulfilling a
United Nations mandate." ' 3 Thus, Bowett concludes that national con-
tingents remain bound by the treaty and customary obligations that
would apply if they were engaged in an international armed conflict
against another State. This approach, although adopted by other com-
mentators"' and supported by the practice of States, 10 5 has its unsat-
isfactory aspects. In practical terms it means that different national
contingents, although engaged in the same conflict, may have differing
obligations in relation to the other party, a most confusing and unsatis-
factory situation. Moreover, as Bowett notes, it is conceivable that the
State against whom the United Nations forces are engaged will have
difficulty in determining its obligations in relation to humanitarian law,
with foreseeable consequences for United Nations forces."°
Despite these difficulties, this approach to peacekeeping forces and
the requirements of the law of armed conflict seemed to work relatively
well. The situation has changed with the development of the peace-
enforcement function of the Security Council. 0 7 The unresolved legal
position that exists in relation to peacekeeping forces is neither satis-
factory nor analogous to peace-enforcement forces that are intended to
use force not just as a last resort in self-defence, but as part of the
Security Council's mandate to restore international peace and security
by more forceful measures. In contrast to peacekeeping activities, en-
forcement functions envisage the possibility of armed conflict between
the United Nations forces and the other parties involved. All the difficult
issues of international humanitarian law, such as the determination of
what sort of attacks are legitimate in terms of the likelihood of civilian
casualties, the lawfulness of the use of certain weapons in light of their
potential to cause unnecessary suffering, and the determination of what
constitutes a military target, never arose in peacekeeping actions.'0 8
103. BOWETT, supra note 6, at 503-04.
104. Schachter, supra note 80, at 76; SEYERSTED, supra note 16, at 197-209.
105. See BowErr, supra note 6, at 503.
106. Id. at 505. Moreover, some of the conventional rules are only binding if all partici-
pants are parties to them. The legal effect of the participation of U.N. forces who cannot
accede to these instruments is to release the other parties from their obligations thereunder.
See Howard J. Taubenfield, International Armed Forces and the Rules of War, 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 671, 674 (1951).
107. It is also unsatisfactory for peacekeeping forces in light of their greatly increased
activity in recent years.
108. However, the operation in the Congo (ONUC) did involve resort to considerable
amounts of force. For a description of the factual background to that conflict and the attitude
of the United Nations and Member States to the question of the application of the law of
armed conflict, see BowErr, supra note 6, at 222-24. See also SEYERSTED, supra note 16, at
192-97.
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Moreover, it is by no means "uncontested" that the rules of customary
international law apply to the forces acting in pursuance of Chapter VII
Security Council powers. Indeed, it is arguable if this were ever the
correct legal position even in relation to peacekeeping forces. Certainly
the force of arguments based on the unequal application of the ius in
bello arising from the ban on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the
Charter have largely dissipated. However, the legal source for States'
military actions - other than those in self-defence - is the Security
Council, and from this flows their legal obligations and rights in relation
to humanitarian law. 109 It seems manifestly incorrect to argue that States
supplying the forces are each in a state of armed conflict with the
State(s) against whom the action is taken. If they are, what is the legal
basis of their action under the ius ad bellum? In my view, this is the
case irrespective of whether these are Article 43 forces or forces volun-
teered by States for Security Council action under Article 42 or some
other provision of Chapter VII. The agreements entered into between the
supplying States and the United Nations in the context of peacekeeping
may resolve many issues between the respective parties to the agree-
ments, but they do not and cannot resolve the position in relation to
third States. Moreover, there are no such agreements in relation to
peace-enforcement forces. "0
109. The weight of authority appears to be against this view. BOWETr, supra note 6, at
493; Schachter, supra note 80, at 76; SEYERSTED, supra note 16, at 197-207. For the purpose
of discussing the applicability of the law of armed conflict, Bowett distinguishes between the
position of national forces themselves and the United Nations itself. He concludes that both
remain bound by the relevant laws of armed conflict, in the case of the United Nations it is
necessarily the relevant customary rules. Seyersted distinguishes between forces under
national command and those under United Nations command. The former are bound by their
national obligations and so by analogy are the latter.
I do not find either of these distinctions particularly helpful except in the context of
relations between the States supplying forces and the United Nations itself. The recently
adopted Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 4,
also supports the view that States remain bound by the law regulating hostilities between
States in "authorized" enforcement action under Chapter VII. Article 2 of the Convention
excludes "a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement
action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel
are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of interna-
tional armed conflict applies." Id. at 4. This provision suggests that the drafters of the
Convention believe that the law regulating the conduct of hostilities between States applies as
between the various forces involved in an enforcement action under Chapter VII Security
Council authorization. On this point, see Bloom, supra note 23, at 624-25.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) quite understandably is not
interested in the doctrinal purity of the situation in relation to United Nations forces. The
ICRC has consistently put forward the view that peacekeeping forces are bound by the
principles of international humanitarian law. It has reiterated this view in relation to peace-
enforcement actions. See International Conference of the Red Cross, Report of the Protection
of War Victims, reprinted in 296 INT'L REV. RED CROss 391, 428-29 (1993). In general, the
ICRC documents refer to the "applicable" or "relevant principles" of humanitarian law, a
reference that avoids the very issue that needs urgent attention.
110. Admittedly, this approach is consistent with the view that seems to be taken by the
States involved and the United Nations itself in relation to "authorized" uses of force: namely,
Winter 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
There is no straightforward resolution to the question of the ius in
bello and the Security Council. It is accepted that the United Nations has
rights and obligations in international law that are appropriate to its
role."' As the Court stated in the Reparation Case, those rights and
obligations "depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or
implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice."" 2 There
are two approaches to resolving the question of the ius in bello and the
Security Council in the exercise of its military enforcement powers. First,
one that is based on the terms of the Charter itself. Second, an approach
that draws on the broader point that the United Nations operates to some
extent within the general system of international law. As I stated earlier,
there is an important distinction in this context between the ius ad bellum
and the ius in bello. In contrast to the ius ad bellum, the Charter does not
deal with the ius in bello, so it is easier to infer that the application of
these rules to the organs of the United Nations is consistent with the
purposes of the Charter. Thus a consideration of the requirements of
Article 1 and 24(2) of the Charter may provide a solution.
The fact that Article 1(1) of the Charter only specifically refers to
the role of international law in the peaceful adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the
peace does not necessarily inferentially exclude the application of legal
constraints in other circumstances. As with the ius ad bellum, the refer-
ence to human rights and fundamental freedoms in Article 1(3) supports
the view that the requirements of international law consistent with these
aims are applicable to the Security Council. Alternatively, an analysis
based on the relationship between the Security Council as an interna-
tional organization and the general system of international law appears
to be an appropriate starting point to unravelling the difficulties posed
by the new activities of the Council. Although developed in the context
of States, currently the ius in bello is more correctly understood as
serving the purpose of regulating the conduct of all international entities
engaged in armed conflict."13 To illustrate this point we only need to
recall the extension by Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of the
rules regulating international armed conflict to certain entities engaged
in the struggle for self-determination." 4 The claim of the ius in bello to
that there is no need for such agreements as the forces are covered by the existing law appli-
cable to States.
111. See supra notes 10, 101.
112. See Reparation Case, supra note 10, 1949 I.C.J. at 180.
113. See Bloom, supra note 23, at 624 n.ll.
114. Protocol I, supra note 3. Bowett points to the practice of political entities who,
though not amounting to States in the traditional sense, have been regarded as engaged in
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this broad role is a strong one. Moreover, its rules are clearly based on
humanitarian considerations and for many years its development has
been premised on universality and the irrelevance of the status of a
parties' resort to force." 5
An interpretation of the Charter that places such limits on the
Security Council is in keeping with the views being expressed by writ-
ers in the context of sanctions. 1 6 If it is the case that the Security Coun-
cil cannot require States to breach fundamental humanitarian values in
the sanction regimes it imposes on States, it is surely anomalous to
regard it as able to do so itself. It is inconceivable that with the current
emphasis on human rights and humanitarian principles, the Security
Council can be regarded as operating outside the constraints on the
conduct of armed conflict that have been painstakingly developed over
the years by States. Moreover, unlike the ius ad bellum, there is a highly
developed body of rules that are available once the threshold question of
applicability is resolved.
To apply the customary law of armed conflict to the Security Coun-
cil is not, however, the ideal situation." 7 For example, as we have seen,
some of its provisions are not adapted for the United Nations. Moreover,
customary rules inevitably lag behind treaty developments and there is
always scope for disagreement as to the exact status of any particular
rule at any particular time. The solution to this dilemma, and one cur-
rently being actively pursued, is to devise some mechanism by which
the United Nations can undertake to comply with the conventional rules
of international humanitarian law and to ensure that the States involved
in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement activities are aware of these
warfare to which the customary rules of armed conflict applied. BOWETr, supra note 6, at
497.
115. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
116. For example, in the context of the International Court of Justice and sanctions,
Gowlland-Debbas writes:
Until now, the Court's adoption of a teleological and evolutionary approach to
Charter interpretation has resulted in expanding international jurisdiction, and hence
the powers of the Organization, vis 6 vis restrictive assertions of sovereignty of
member States.
The application of these principles today, however, could serve not to expand,
but to constrain, the use of these powers in certain situations. This is particularly
relevant with respect to the powers of the Council under Chapter VII.
Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 44, at 667.
117. Although much of the law of armed conflict is codified, the majority of its provi-
sions would now also be reflected in custom. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989). See also Theodor Meron, The Time Has
Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol 1, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 681-82
(1994) (discussing customary law status of Protocol I). See supra notes 22, 95-96.
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obligations."' In the ultimate analysis, it is the responsibility of the
United Nations to train peacekeepers and peace-enforcers in the require-
ments of international humanitarian law." 9 Doubtless it can delegate this
function to States and make any agreements it likes as to the discipline
of the armed forces involved, but this does not obscure the basic legal
position that it is the United Nations that bears the primary responsibil-
ity for these forces.
B. The Security Council and Economic Sanctions
Even if it were the case that the Security Council was obliged to
comply with the rules of international humanitarian law, there would
still be aspects of its activities that reveal deficiencies in that regime.
The Lockerbie Case has reinforced a situation that has begun to concern
commentators, namely the question of sanctions.' 20 An exact parallel of
the fact situation before the Court in the Lockerbie Case could not arise
in the context of humanitarian law and United Nations enforcement
actions. Articles 103 and 25 only come into operation where there is a
decision of the Security Council that is inconsistent with a State's treaty
obligations vis-a-vis another State. The current practice of "authoriza-
tion" does not meet the criteria of decision within these provisions so as
to bring them into operation.' Moreover, even if Article 43 were to
come into operation and a permanent force were established, its mem-
bers would be United Nations forces and governed by the principles of
law applicable to the United Nations itself. The parallel situation of the
Lockerbie Case has arisen, however, in the case of economic sanctions.
Decisions of the Security Council to impose sanctions against States
118. See Claudio Caratsch, Humanitarian Design and Political Interference: Red Cross
Work in the Post-Cold War Period, 11 INT'L REL. 301, 312 (1993). See also supra note 100.
There are various possibilities that have been canvassed by other writers. See, e.g., BOWETT,
supra note 6, at 515-16.
119. This is neither a recent nor original suggestion. See Article 4 of the 1971 Zagreb
Resolution, supra note 10, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR at 374, that urged the United
Nations to take a coordinating role. to ensure that individuals participating in United Nations
forces received adequate instructions in relation to humanitarian law.
120. See Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population of States Under
Embargo Measures, paper presented at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 18th
Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law (June 1993) (manu-
script on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
121. If the practice of "authorization" does not bring these forces under the corporate
veil of the Security Council, it would theoretically be possible for the Security Council to
adopt a decision under Chapter VII instructing States to take action inconsistent with their
treaty obligations in respect of humanitarian law as a measure to restore international peace
and security. This does not seem so far fetched given the recent activities that the Security
Council has viewed as measures to restore international peace and security.
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under Article 42 of the Charter are mandatory. As a consequence of the
combined operation of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, any such
decision must be complied with by States irrespective of whether they
may be in breach of their obligations under the conventional rules of
international humanitarian law. 122 Although in one sense a limited prob-
lem, in that such a situation could only arise while the conflict contin-
ues,'23 it is also part of the wider challenges caused by the Security
Council's broad mandate to restore international peace and security and
the limitations of the present regime of humanitarian law.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have argued for the rejection of the view that the
Security Council is controlled exclusively by political means when it is
exercising its military enforcement role under the United Nations Char-
ter; In light of the wide ranging impact of such actions, it is essential to
recognize that the law has some role to play in setting the limits of
these powers. The text of the Charter, a legal document, is not only
compatible with but arguably, through its emphasis on human rights and
humanitarian values, requires the Security Council to measure its re-
sponses against legal criteria. These criteria can be extrapolated from
those that have been painstakingly developed in the context of States.
To regard the purposes and principles of the Charter as merely words of
exhortation allows for dangerous leeways of choice to an unrepresenta-
tive body necessarily swayed by considerations that may be antithetical
to the ideals of the Charter. In my view, the ius ad bellum of the Char-
ter in relation to collective security actions incorporates the general
principles of proportionality and necessity, adapted as they must be to
their context. Less controversially, I regard the Council as under a legal
obligation to ensure that forces acting under its auspices comply with
the appropriate customary rules of humanitarian law.
122. See Theodor Meron, Prisoners of War Civilians and Diplomats in the Gulf Crisis,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 108 (1991). Meron appears to accept that the Security Council
theoretically could disregard the requirements of humanitarian law although he does not
expressly deal with the customary law issue. See also Gowiland-Debbas, supra note 10, at
91-93.
123. In general, the rules of humanitarian law, with some exceptions such as the Fourth
Geneva Convention, see supra note 90, only apply while there is a situation amounting to
armed conflict. However, the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council does not appear to
be applying the letter of the law in its practice in relation to sanctions. See also Hans-Peter
Gasser, supra note 120, who states that "the provisions of international humanitarian law are
applicable to economic sanctions. This holds true for ... sanctions decided as a measure of
collective security." Id. at 1. See also COMMENTAIRE DES PROTOCOLES ADDITIONNELS DU 8
JUIN 1977 AUX CONVENTIONS DE GEN9VE DU 12 AOOT 1949, at 1035 (Yves Sandoz et al.
eds., 1986).
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There are still many important and complex issues that require
detailed analysis before any conclusions can be confidently drawn about
the legal regime in which the Security Council operates. Consequently,
much of the discussion in this paper has had to be hedged with qualifi-
cations. For example, a determination of the legal basis of the recent
practice of "authorizing" States to use force is a prerequisite to any firm
conclusion as to its legal consequences. The relationship between the
Security Council and the general rules of State responsibility, partic-
ularly issues relating to control, also require analysis. Thus, to some
extent, the discussion of enforcement actions awaits further examination.
This flows from the complexity of the issues that has been demonstrated
over the years by States' experience with peacekeeping operations. One
thing is clear, if the Security Council is to continue its active role in
situations that involve the use of armed force, the question of what
restraints apply needs to be resolved as a matter of urgency in the
interests of all participants, both civilian and combatant. With respect to
the ius in bello, it is already difficult enough to ensure compliance with
the provisions of humanitarian law without the added problems associat-
ed with an unclear legal position in relation to United Nations forces. A
code for such situations should be drawn up and the legal mechanisms
by which United Nations forces can assume such obligations should be
resolved. The question of humanitarian law and economic sanctions also
needs resolution.
As for the ius ad bellum, one of the major purposes of international
law throughout its development has been to impose restraints on the use
of force. It is inconceivable that it was intended that the use of force in
all circumstances, except self-defence, would be granted to a political
body subject to no legal controls whatsoever. This runs counter to the
increasingly important role that international law is perceived to play in
the international community, particularly in the area of human rights.
Moreover, one method by which the Security Council can fulfill its
Charter duty to encourage respect for human rights and humanitarian
principles is to set an example and ensure its military enforcement
actions are conducted in an exemplary fashion. In the final analysis the
legal questions are by no means insuperable. Commentators have over
the years provided workable and satisfactory solutions. They must be
adopted forthwith in the interests of all victims of war, combatants and
civilians alike.
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